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RECENT CASES
follow such precedent, the majority relied heavily upon the
reasoning of Judge Haynsworth's dissenting opinion in United
States v Bond.9  They felt that since a provision allowing
real estate taxes paid by a mortgagee to be added to the
principal amount of the mortgage is generally recognized in
commerce and law, the Congress must have intended to
protect that right when it gave the recorded mortgage priority
over a subsequently recorded federal tax lien.10
It is submitted that the holding of the instant case should
be followed. The mortgagee, upon entering into the mort-
gage, relies upon his ability to protect his investment against
steadily mounting interest and penalties on unpaid local taxes
by paying those taxes and adding the sum paid to his
mortgage. This traditional right of the mortgagee must
have been recognized by Congress when it provided preference
for a prior mortgage over a subsequently recorded federal
tax lien.
MITCHELL L. OLSON
UNFAIR COMPETITION - TRADE MARK I N F R I N G E-
MENT - JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE CONFUSION TEST -
Plaintiff, which had coined the word "POLAROID" as a trade
name for a wide variety of products, including optical devices
and photographic equipment, appealed the United States
District Court's (N.D Ill.) decision not to enjoin defendant's
use of the term "POLARAID" in connection with his business
of installing refrigeration and heating systems. In reversing,
the Seventh District Court of Appeals held, with one dissent,
that "POLARAID" so closely resembles "POLAROID" that
it is likely to produce confusion of source, to the injury of
the corporation to which the name belongs. Polaroid
Corporation v Polaraid, Inc., 319 F 2d. 830 (7th Cir 1963)
The use of trademarks to identify merchandise has existed
New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S.
361 (1953) United States v Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950)
State of Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946) United States
v. Waddil, Holland & Flinn Co. 323 U.S. 353 (1945). (These cases involved
statutory liens, insolvency etc.)
9. 275 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1960) at 848.
10. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1958).
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for centuries." The right to protect that mark developed
with the common law 2 That remedy led to the "secondary
meaning" doctrine which arose in England during the latter
part of the nineteenth century,3 and was recognized in the
United States shortly thereafter 4 This doctrine permits a
court of equity to enjoin a defendant from passing off his
goods as those of the plaintiff. 5  The plaintiff's case fails
if he cannot establish this "passing off" or "palming off" by
the defendant.6
The 1905 Federal Trademark Act7 was interpreted by the
courts to mean that there had to be competition between the
products in order for there to be trademark infringement."
This was unsatisfactory since a defendant could market an
inferior product with the plaintiff's trademark as long as the
products were of different classes, and thereby injure the
plaintiff's good will.
The Aunt Jemima Case9 of 1917 rejected the "compe-
tition" test interpretation of the trademark act, and developed
the "confusion" test. 10 This began a trend placing emphasis
on "unfair" rather than on "competition" 11 With the
1. See generally, NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS, (4th Ed.
1947).
2. Newby v. Oregon Cent. Ry Co., Deady 609, 18 Fed. Cas. 38, Case No.
10,144 (1869) Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1871).
3. Wotherspoon v. Currie, L.R. 5 Eng. & Ir. App. 508 (1872) See Singer
Machine Mfrs. v. Wilson, 3 App. Cas. 376 (1877).
4. Elgin Nat'l. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901) See
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938)
which indicates that secondary meaning arises when the mark has been used in
such a manner that to the public mind it does not merely register in its descrip-
tive or geographical sense, but is instantly associated with the manufacturer or
marketeer of the goods, rather than with the goods themselves.
5. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 61 F Supp. 247 (E.D. N.Y. 1945)
Plough, Inc., v. Intercity Oil Co., 26 F Supp. 978 (E.D. Penn. 1939).
6. Coats v. Merrich Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893) Goodyear India Rubber v.
Goodyear Rubber, 128 U.S. 598 (1888).
7. Ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (1905). This act prohibited the use of a trademark
on merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as that for which
the mark was registered.
8. Bordens Condensed Milk Co. v. Bordan Ice Cream, 201 Fed. 510 (1912),
See HOPKINS, TRADEMARKS § 129 (4th Ed. 1924).
9. Aunt Jemima Co. v. Rigney, 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
10. Brooks Brothers v. Brooks Clothing of Cal., 60 F Supp. 442 (S.D. Cal.
1945), aff'd. 158 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 824 (1947) East-
ern Const. Co. v. Eastern Eng'r. Corp., 246 N.Y. 459, 159 N.E. 397 (1927). Here
Justice Lehman declared.
"Justification, if any for the injunction, must rest upon a
finding that the corporate name which the defendant has
adopted, with the sanction of the state, is so similar to the
name under which the plaintiff conducts his business that the
public may be confused, and that some person may do business
with the defendant in the belief that they are dealing with the
plaintiff."
11. Bulova Watch Co. v. Slotzberg, 69 F Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
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passage of the Lanham Act, 12 some courts seemed to consider
the "confusion test" codified.1 3  The purpose of this act is
indicated in the Congressional Record4 but, because the
United States Supreme Court has not interpreted it, a variety
of interpretations as to what constitutes trademark infringe-
ment have been promulgated by the lower courts. 5
Despite these differences of opinion, "(i)t is settled law
that a plaintiff who has established a right to a trade name.
is entitled to protection of his reputation against the use of
that name by others even upon non-competing goods, if the
defendant's goods are likely to be thought to originate with
the plaintiff. ' ' 16
In the instant case the opinion clearly indicates that this
court has adopted the "confusion test." The lower court
found, as a fact, that there had been no confusion among the
trade or customers and that no such confusion was likely to
occur " The appellate court held that there was likelihood
of confusion and that this finding warranted a reversal.
8
It is submitted that the confusion test is the better rule
for determining trademark infringement. However, it
appears that whether this likelihood of confusion exists, must
necessarily be a question of fact. It is difficult to see how
the circuit court could reach the determination it did on this
12. Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (1958).
13. S. C. Johnson & Sons v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949).
14. U. S. Code Congressional Service 1946, at 1274
"One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is pro-
tected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates
and cheats."
15. E.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Injunction denied despite evidence of confusion on ground that no injury was
shown) Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161 (5th
Cir. 1957) (Injunction denied, no similarity of products), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
894 (1957) G. B. Kent & Sons v. Lorillard Co., 114 F Supp. 621 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953) (Injunction denied on strict application of confusion test), aff'd,
210 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1954) Hyde Park Clothes, Inc., v. Hyde Park Fashions, 204
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1953) (Injunction denied since injuries complained of were
outbalanced by defendant's interests), cert. dented, 346 U.S. 827 (1953).
16. Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948)
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
17. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad, Inc., 206 F Supp. 290, 295 (N.D. Ill.
1962). This court also found that there was no competition between the Prod-
ucts, no injury or likelihood of injury to the plaintiff's good will, and that the
plaintiff would not likely expand into the defendant's business area.
18. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963).
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issue, without concluding that there was no reasonable
evidentiary basis for the trial court's findings.
DONALD HOLLOWAY
